In October 2020, the United States and seven partner nations signed a short document called the Artemis Accords. It described, in non-binding language, a set of principles for how signatory nations would conduct civil activity on the Moon: peaceful purposes, transparency, interoperability of systems, emergency assistance, registration of objects, release of scientific data, preservation of historic sites, mitigation of orbital debris, and the management of “safety zones” around active operations.
Five and a half years later, the Accords have more than 55 signatories, including most of Europe, Japan, India, the United Arab Emirates, Brazil, South Korea, Australia, and a growing list of African nations. China and Russia have not signed and have explicitly objected to portions of the framework. The expansion is the most significant development in space governance since the Outer Space Treaty of 1967.
What the Accords actually do (and do not do)
The Accords are not a treaty. They are not legally binding under international law. A signatory that violates them faces no formal sanction beyond reputational cost and exclusion from future cooperative programs.
What they do is establish a shared interpretation of how the existing Outer Space Treaty applies to the kinds of activity that are now becoming possible: extracting and using lunar resources, operating long-duration surface infrastructure, conducting commercial activity alongside government missions, and coordinating multiple simultaneous landings near scarce resources like polar water ice.
The most contested provision is the “safety zone” concept, which allows an operator to designate an area around active operations where other parties should coordinate before entering. Critics argue this approaches a de facto property claim, which the Outer Space Treaty prohibits. Supporters argue it is a practical coordination mechanism, not an assertion of sovereignty. The actual legal status will probably not be resolved until two signatories attempt overlapping operations in the same polar region, which is plausible before 2030.
Why China and Russia are outside
China declined to join the Accords and has built a parallel framework called the International Lunar Research Station, with Russia as its founding partner. Roughly a dozen nations have signed on, mostly from the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation. The two programs are not direct mirrors of each other: ILRS is a specific cooperative infrastructure project, while the Accords are a set of behavioral norms. But the political alignment is unmistakable, and the existence of two parallel frameworks means lunar governance is likely to develop along bloc lines through the 2030s.
The Wolf Amendment, a U.S. law that restricts NASA cooperation with Chinese government entities, has prevented serious bilateral engagement since 2011. The amendment is renewed annually in NASA’s appropriations and has bipartisan support. Without a change in U.S. domestic law, formal U.S.-China space cooperation will remain limited to narrow scientific channels.
What this means for the next decade
The most important question for international cooperation in space is not whether the Accords succeed as a document. It is whether the operating norms they describe become standard practice on the surface. If the first wave of lunar operators (NASA, ESA, JAXA, ISRO, and their commercial partners) follow the transparency, interoperability, and safety-zone provisions in practice, those norms will harden into customary international law regardless of whether China and Russia formally accept them.
If they do not (if “safety zones” creep toward exclusion zones, or if interoperability fails because each operator builds incompatible systems) then the framework will be remembered as a missed opportunity, and the legal vacuum it was meant to fill will reopen at the worst possible time.
What to watch next
The next round of Accords signings is expected at the 2026 International Astronautical Congress in Antalya. Two African nations and one Central Asian nation are reportedly in advanced discussions. More consequentially, the first overlapping lunar operations (likely between a NASA-contracted commercial lander and an ISRO mission near the south pole) are scheduled within the next 24 months. How that coordination plays out will tell us whether the Accords are a governance framework or a press release.